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Closing the hole argument

Halvorson, Hans and Manchak, JB (2021) Closing the hole argument. [Preprint]

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Abstract

The hole argument purportedly shows that spacetime substantivalism implies a pernicious form of indeterminism. Here we attempt to answer the question: what is the mathematical fact that is supposed to underwrite the hole argument? We identify two relevant mathematical claims. The first claim is trivially true, and Weatherall (2018) has convincingly argued that it cannot support the hole argument. The second claim would support the hole argument, but we prove that it is false. Therefore, there is no basis for the hole argument.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Halvorson, Hanshhalvors@princeton.edu0000-0003-3022-2344
Manchak, JBjmanchak@uci.edu
Keywords: spacetime, substantivalism, relationalism, determinism, hole argument
Subjects: General Issues > Determinism/Indeterminism
Specific Sciences > Physics > Relativity Theory
Specific Sciences > Physics > Symmetries/Invariances
Depositing User: Hans Halvorson
Date Deposited: 04 Nov 2021 04:39
Last Modified: 04 Nov 2021 04:39
Item ID: 19790
Subjects: General Issues > Determinism/Indeterminism
Specific Sciences > Physics > Relativity Theory
Specific Sciences > Physics > Symmetries/Invariances
Date: 3 November 2021
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/19790

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