VanDrunen, Jacob and Herrmann, Daniel A. (2022) Naturalizing Natural Salience. In: UNSPECIFIED.

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Abstract

In the paradigm of Lewis-Skyrms signaling games, the emergence of linguistic conventions is a matter of equilibrium selection. What happens when an equilibrium has "natural salience" -- stands out as uniquely attractive to the players? We present two models. We find that the dynamics of natural salience can encourage the learning of more successful signaling conventions in some contexts, and discourage it in others. This reveals ways in which the supposed worst-case scenario -- a lack of natural salience -- might be better than some cases in which natural salience is present.

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Item Type:	Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID VanDrunen, Jacob jackvandrunen@gmail.com 0000-0002-7719-8196 Herrmann, Daniel A. daherrma@uci.edu 0000-0001-5322-1921
Keywords:	signaling games, natural salience, self-assembly, Darwin
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Biology > Evolutionary Theory General Issues > Decision Theory General Issues > Game Theory
Depositing User:	Mr. Jacob VanDrunen
Date Deposited:	31 May 2022 02:34
Last Modified:	31 May 2022 02:34
Item ID:	20690
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Biology > Evolutionary Theory General Issues > Decision Theory General Issues > Game Theory
Date:	2022
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/20690

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• Naturalizing Natural Salience. (deposited 31 May 2022 02:34) [Currently Displayed]
  • Naturalizing Natural Salience. (deposited 12 May 2023 12:26)

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