Belot, Gordon (2023) That Does Not Compute: David Lewis on Credence and Chance. In: UNSPECIFIED.
|
Text
ViceMini.pdf Download (271kB) | Preview |
Abstract
Like Lewis, many philosophers hold reductionist accounts of chance (on which claims about chance are to be understood as claims that certain patterns of events are instantiated) and maintain that rationality requires that credence should defer to chance (in the sense that under certain circumstances one's credence in an event must coincide with the chance of that event). It is a shortcoming of an account of chance if it implies that this norm of rationality is unsatisfiable by computable agents. This shortcoming is more common than one might have hoped.
| Export/Citation: | EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL |
| Social Networking: |
| Item Type: | Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED) | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Creators: |
|
||||||
| Additional Information: | Forthcoming in Philosophy of Science | ||||||
| Keywords: | Credence; Chance; Bayesian; David Lewis | ||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Confirmation/Induction General Issues > Formal Learning Theory Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics |
||||||
| Depositing User: | Gordon Belot | ||||||
| Date Deposited: | 10 Jan 2023 14:06 | ||||||
| Last Modified: | 10 Jan 2023 14:06 | ||||||
| Item ID: | 21631 | ||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Confirmation/Induction General Issues > Formal Learning Theory Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics |
||||||
| Date: | 9 January 2023 | ||||||
| URI: | http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/21631 |
Monthly Views for the past 3 years
Monthly Downloads for the past 3 years
Plum Analytics
Actions (login required)
 |
View Item |
![[feed]](http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/style/images/feed-icon-32x32.png){kind=icon}