Belot, Gordon (2023) That Does Not Compute: David Lewis on Credence and Chance. In: UNSPECIFIED.

Preview

Text ViceMini.pdf Download (271kB) | Preview

Abstract

Like Lewis, many philosophers hold reductionist accounts of chance (on which claims about chance are to be understood as claims that certain patterns of events are instantiated) and maintain that rationality requires that credence should defer to chance (in the sense that under certain circumstances one's credence in an event must coincide with the chance of that event). It is a shortcoming of an account of chance if it implies that this norm of rationality is unsatisfiable by computable agents. This shortcoming is more common than one might have hoped.

---

Export/Citation:

EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL

Social Networking:

Share |

---

Item Type:	Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Belot, Gordon
Additional Information:	Forthcoming in Philosophy of Science
Keywords:	Credence; Chance; Bayesian; David Lewis
Subjects:	General Issues > Confirmation/Induction General Issues > Formal Learning Theory Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
Depositing User:	Gordon Belot
Date Deposited:	10 Jan 2023 14:06
Last Modified:	10 Jan 2023 14:06
Item ID:	21631
Subjects:	General Issues > Confirmation/Induction General Issues > Formal Learning Theory Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
Date:	9 January 2023
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/21631

Available Versions of this Item

• That Does Not Compute: David Lewis on Credence and Chance. (deposited 10 Jan 2023 14:06) [Currently Displayed]
  • That Does Not Compute: David Lewis on Credence and Chance. (deposited 14 Jun 2023 17:08)

Monthly Views for the past 3 years

Monthly Downloads for the past 3 years

Plum Analytics

Actions (login required)

View Item