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Being ourselves and knowing ourselves: An adverbial account of mental representations

Meijsing, Monica (2006) Being ourselves and knowing ourselves: An adverbial account of mental representations. [Preprint]

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    Abstract

    This paper takes an evolutionary approach to what we are, namely autopoietic systems with a first person perspective on our surroundings and ourselves. This in contrast with Thomas Metzinger’s views in his Being No One. Though perception does involve internal processing and representations, it is argued that perception is direct. We track real features of the world, but fallibly, in a certain way. Moreover, it is claimed that mental representations are quite different from internal neural representations. They are best construed in an adverbial way. What we perceive, the object of perception, is the real world. Internal neural representations are the means by which we perceive the world. And mental representations are the way in which we experience the world, the adverbial content of perception. Finally, what goes for the world goes for ourselves as well: in self-consciousness we track real features of ourselves, but fallibly, in a certain way.


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    Item Type: Preprint
    Keywords: autopoiesis; evolution; phenomenal experience; first person perspective;internal representations; mental representations; perception; self
    Subjects: Specific Sciences > Psychology/Psychiatry
    Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science
    Specific Sciences > Biology > Evolutionary Psychology
    Depositing User: Monica Meijsing
    Date Deposited: 11 Nov 2006
    Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 11:14
    Item ID: 3030
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/3030

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