Titelbaum, Michael (2007) Unlearning What You Have Learned. In:  LSE-Pitt Conference: Confirmation, Induction and Science (London, 8 - 10 March, 2007).
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Bayesian modeling techniques have proven remarkably successful at representing rational constraints on agents’ degrees of belief. Yet Frank Arntzenius’s “Shangri-La” example shows that these techniques fail for stories involving forgetting. This paper presents a formalized, expanded Bayesian modeling framework that generates intuitive verdicts about agents’ degrees of belief after losing information. The framework’s key result, called Generalized Conditionalization, yields applications like a version of Bas van Fraassen’s Reflection Principle for forgetting. These applications lead to questions about why agents should coordinate their doxastic states over time, and about the commitments an agent can make by assigning degrees of belief.
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|Item Type:||Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)|
|Subjects:||Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics|
General Issues > Decision Theory
General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
|Conferences and Volumes:|| LSE-Pitt Conference: Confirmation, Induction and Science (London, 8 - 10 March, 2007)|
|Depositing User:||Michael Titelbaum|
|Date Deposited:||03 Jan 2007|
|Last Modified:||07 Oct 2010 11:14|
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