PhilSci Archive

Is the Conjunction Fallacy tied to Probabilistic Confirmation?

Schupbach, Jonah N. (2008) Is the Conjunction Fallacy tied to Probabilistic Confirmation? UNSPECIFIED.


Download (51kB)


Crupi, Fitelson, and Tentori (CFT, forthcoming) offer three conditions that constitute an attempted confirmation-theoretic explanation of the conjunction fallacy. I present experimental results to show that CFT’s conditions are neither necessary nor sufficient for the fallacy. There exist cases that do not meet their three conditions in which subjects still tend to commit the fallacy. Also, there exist cases that meet all three of CFT’s conditions in which subjects do not tend to commit the fallacy. In light of these experiments, CFT’s account of the conjunction fallacy cannot be right as it stands.

Export/Citation: EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL
Social Networking:
Share |

Item Type: Other
Schupbach, Jonah N.
Commentary on: Vincenzo, Crupi and Branden, Fitelson and Katya, Tentori (2007) Probability, Confirmation, and the Conjunction Fallacy. In: UNSPECIFIED.
Keywords: confirmation theory, Bayesianism, conjunction fallacy, human judgment, uncertainty, human reasoning
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
Specific Sciences > Psychology/Psychiatry
Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science
General Issues > Formal Learning Theory
General Issues > Experimentation
Depositing User: Jonah N. Schupbach
Date Deposited: 23 Dec 2007
Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 15:16
Item ID: 3755

Commentary/Response Threads

Monthly Views for the past 3 years

Monthly Downloads for the past 3 years

Plum Analytics

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item