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Is the Conjunction Fallacy tied to Probabilistic Confirmation?

Schupbach, Jonah N. (2008) Is the Conjunction Fallacy tied to Probabilistic Confirmation? UNSPECIFIED.

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    Abstract

    Crupi, Fitelson, and Tentori (CFT, forthcoming) offer three conditions that constitute an attempted confirmation-theoretic explanation of the conjunction fallacy. I present experimental results to show that CFT’s conditions are neither necessary nor sufficient for the fallacy. There exist cases that do not meet their three conditions in which subjects still tend to commit the fallacy. Also, there exist cases that meet all three of CFT’s conditions in which subjects do not tend to commit the fallacy. In light of these experiments, CFT’s account of the conjunction fallacy cannot be right as it stands.


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    Item Type: Other
    Commentary on: Vincenzo, Crupiand Branden, Fitelson and Katya, Tentori (2007) Probability, Confirmation, and the Conjunction Fallacy. In: [2007] LSE-Pitt Conference: Confirmation, Induction and Science (London, 8 - 10 March, 2007).
    Keywords: confirmation theory, Bayesianism, conjunction fallacy, human judgment, uncertainty, human reasoning
    Subjects: Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
    General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
    Specific Sciences > Psychology/Psychiatry
    Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science
    General Issues > Formal Learning Theory
    General Issues > Experimentation
    Depositing User: Jonah N. Schupbach
    Date Deposited: 23 Dec 2007
    Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 11:16
    Item ID: 3755
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/3755

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