Greaves, Hilary and Myrvold, Wayne (2008) Everett and evidence. [Preprint]

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Abstract
Much of the evidence for quantum mechanics is statistical in nature. Relative frequency data summarizing the results of repeated experiments is compared to probabilities calculated from the theory; close agreement between the observed relative frequencies and calculated probabilities is taken as evidence in favour of the theory. The Everett interpretation, if it is to be a candidate for serious consideration, must be capable of doing justice to this sort of reasoning. Since, on the Everett interpretation, all outcomes with nonzero amplitude are actualized on dierent branches, it is not obvious that sense can be made of ascribing probabilities to outcomes of experiments, and this poses a prima facie problem for statistical inference. It is incumbent on the Everettian either to make sense of ascribing probabilities to outcomes of experiments in the Everett interpretation, or to find a substitute on which the usual statistical analysis of experimental results continues to count as evidence for quantum mechanics, and, since it is the very evidence for quantum mechanics that is at stake, this must be done in a way that does not presuppose the correctness of Everettian quantum mechanics. This requires an account of theory conrmation that applies to branchinguniverse theories but does not presuppose the correctness of any such theory. In this paper, we supply and defend such an account. The account has the consequence that statistical evidence can confirm a branchinguniverse theory such as Everettian quantum mechanics in the same way in which it can confirm a nonbranching probabilistic theory.
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Item Type:  Preprint  

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Keywords:  Everett interpretation; many worlds; probability; decision theory; Bayes  
Subjects:  General Issues > Decision Theory General Issues > Confirmation/Induction General Issues > Theory Change Specific Sciences > Physics > Quantum Mechanics 

Depositing User:  Hilary Greaves  
Date Deposited:  09 Oct 2008  
Last Modified:  07 Oct 2010 15:17  
Item ID:  4222  
Subjects:  General Issues > Decision Theory General Issues > Confirmation/Induction General Issues > Theory Change Specific Sciences > Physics > Quantum Mechanics 

Date:  August 2008  
URI:  http://philsciarchive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/4222 
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