Van Dyck, Maarten (2008) Dynamics of Reason and the Kantian Project. In: UNSPECIFIED.

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Abstract

I show why Michael Friedman’s idea that we should view new constitutive frameworks introduced in paradigm-change as members of a convergent series, introduces an uncomfortable tension in his views. It cannot be justified on realist grounds, as this would compromise his Kantian perspective, but his own appeal to a Kantian regulative ideal of reason cannot do the job either. I then explain how to make better sense of the rationality of paradigm-change on what I take to Friedman’s own terms.

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Item Type:	Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Van Dyck, Maarten
Keywords:	Friedman Kant convergence
Subjects:	General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science General Issues > Theory Change General Issues > Philosophers of Science General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Depositing User:	Maarten Van Dyck
Date Deposited:	13 Nov 2008
Last Modified:	07 Oct 2010 15:17
Item ID:	4332
Subjects:	General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science General Issues > Theory Change General Issues > Philosophers of Science General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Date:	2008
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/4332

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