Price, Huw (2007) The Effective Indexical. [Preprint]
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In a famous paper in Noûs in 1979, John Perry points out that action depends on indexical beliefs. In addition to “third-person” information about her environment, an agent need “ﬁrst-person” information about where, when and who she is. This conclusion is widely interpreted as a reason for thinking that tensed claims cannot be translated without loss into untensed language; but not as a reason for realism about tensed facts. In another famous paper in the same volume of Noûs, Nancy Cartwright argues that action requires that agents represent their world in causal terms, rather than merely probabilistic terms: for, Cartwright argues, there’s a distinction between eﬀective and ineﬀective strategies, that otherwise goes missing. This is widely taken as a reason for thinking that causal claims cannot be translated without loss into merely probabilistic claims; and also – in contrast to Perry’s case – widely regarded as a reason for realism about causation. In this paper I ask whether the latter conclusion is compulsory, or whether, as in Perry’s case, the need for causal beliefs might merely reﬂect some “situated” aspect of a decision-maker’s perspective.
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|Keywords:||Causation, indexicals, effective strategies, Perry, Cartwright|
|Subjects:||General Issues > Decision Theory|
General Issues > Causation
|Depositing User:||Prof Huw Price|
|Date Deposited:||04 Mar 2009|
|Last Modified:||07 Oct 2010 11:17|
Available Versions of this Item
- The Effective Indexcial. (deposited 17 Aug 2009)
- The Effective Indexical. (deposited 04 Mar 2009)[Currently Displayed]
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