Maley, Corey (2009) Analog and Digital, Continuous and Discrete. In:  Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, 101st Annual Meeting (Savannah, GA April 9-11).
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Representation is central to contemporary theorizing about the mind/brain. But the nature of representation--both in the mind/brain and more generally--is a source of ongoing controversy. One way of categorizing representational types is to distinguish between the analog and the digital: the received view is that analog representations vary smoothly, while digital representations vary in a step-wise manner. I argue that this characterization is inadequate to account for the ways in which representation is used in cognitive science; in its place, I suggest an alternative taxonomy. I will defend and extend David Lewis's account of analog and digital representation, distinguishing analog from continuous representation, as well as digital from discrete representation. I will argue that the distinctions available in this four-fold account accord with representational features of theoretical interest in cognitive science more usefully than the received analog/digital dichotomy.
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|Item Type:||Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)|
|Keywords:||analog digital representation|
|Subjects:||Specific Sciences > Computation/Information > Classical|
Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science
|Conferences and Volumes:|| Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, 101st Annual Meeting (Savannah, GA April 9-11)|
|Depositing User:||Corey Maley|
|Date Deposited:||07 Jun 2009|
|Last Modified:||07 Oct 2010 11:18|
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- Analog and Digital, Continuous and Discrete. (deposited 03 Feb 2009)
- Analog and Digital, Continuous and Discrete. (deposited 07 Jun 2009)[Currently Displayed]
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