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Analog and Digital, Continuous and Discrete

Maley, Corey (2009) Analog and Digital, Continuous and Discrete. In: [2009] Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, 101st Annual Meeting (Savannah, GA April 9-11).

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    Representation is central to contemporary theorizing about the mind/brain. But the nature of representation--both in the mind/brain and more generally--is a source of ongoing controversy. One way of categorizing representational types is to distinguish between the analog and the digital: the received view is that analog representations vary smoothly, while digital representations vary in a step-wise manner. I argue that this characterization is inadequate to account for the ways in which representation is used in cognitive science; in its place, I suggest an alternative taxonomy. I will defend and extend David Lewis's account of analog and digital representation, distinguishing analog from continuous representation, as well as digital from discrete representation. I will argue that the distinctions available in this four-fold account accord with representational features of theoretical interest in cognitive science more usefully than the received analog/digital dichotomy.

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    Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
    Keywords: analog digital representation
    Subjects: Specific Sciences > Computation/Information > Classical
    Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science
    Conferences and Volumes: [2009] Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, 101st Annual Meeting (Savannah, GA April 9-11)
    Depositing User: Corey Maley
    Date Deposited: 07 Jun 2009
    Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 11:18
    Item ID: 4692

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