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Probabilities in Statistical Mechanics: Subjective, Objective, or a Bit of Both?

Myrvold, Wayne C. (2011) Probabilities in Statistical Mechanics: Subjective, Objective, or a Bit of Both? [Preprint]

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    This paper addresses the question of how we should regard the probability distributions introduced into statistical mechanics. It will be argued that it is problematic to take them either as purely subjective credences, or as objective chances. I will propose a third alternative: they are "almost objective" probabilities, or "epistemic chances". The definition of such probabilities involves an interweaving of epistemic and physical considerations, and so cannot be classified as either purely subjective or purely objective. This conception, it will be argued, resolves some of the puzzles associated with statistical mechanical probabilities; it explains how probabilistic posits introduced on the basis of incomplete knowledge can yield testable predictions, and it also bypasses the problem of disastrous retrodictions, that is, the fact the standard equilibrium measures yield high probability of the system being in equilibrium in the recent past, even when we know otherwise. As the problem does not arise on the conception of probabilities considered here, there is no need to invoke a Past Hypothesis as a special posit to avoid it.

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    Item Type: Preprint
    Keywords: Statistical mechanics; thermodynamics; probability; chance; method of arbitrary functions.
    Subjects: Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
    Specific Sciences > Physics > Statistical Mechanics/Thermodynamics
    Depositing User: Wayne Myrvold
    Date Deposited: 01 Jun 2011 06:33
    Last Modified: 17 Jul 2012 02:05
    Item ID: 8642

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