Wheeler, Gregory (2012) Objective Bayesian calibration and the problem of non-convex evidence. [Preprint]
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Abstract
Jon Williamson's Objective Bayesian Epistemology relies upon a calibration norm to constrain credal probability by both quantitative and qualitative evidence. One role of the calibration norm is to ensure that evidence works to constrain a convex set of probability functions. This essay brings into focus a problem for Williamson's theory when qualitative evidence specifies non-convex constraints.
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| Item Type: | Preprint |
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| Keywords: | Objective Bayesian epistemology, convex sets, imprecise probabilities |
| Subjects: | General Issues > Confirmation/Induction General Issues > Decision Theory Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics |
| Depositing User: | Gregory Wheeler |
| Date Deposited: | 12 Jan 2012 11:54 |
| Last Modified: | 12 Jan 2012 11:54 |
| Item ID: | 8990 |
| URI: | http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/8990 |
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