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The Robots of the Dawn of Experimental Philosophy of Mind

Sytsma, Justin (2013) The Robots of the Dawn of Experimental Philosophy of Mind. [Preprint]

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    Abstract

    In this chapter, I consider two hypotheses that have informed recent work in experimental philosophy of mind. The first is a positive hypothesis put forward by Fiala, Arico, and Nichols (FAN): Categorization of an entity as an agent through fast, automatic, and domain-specific processing produces a disposition to ascribe a wide range of mental states to that entity. The second is a negative hypothesis put forward by Sytsma and Machery: The existence of phenomenally conscious mental states is not obvious from first-person experience with states like seeing red and feeling pain. I argue that these hypotheses are not necessary at odds. Despite this, empirical results reported by Sytsma and Machery raise concerns for FAN's hypothesis, while results reported by FAN in response raise concerns for our hypothesis. I address these concerns in this essay, presenting the results of four new studies that support our negative hypothesis against FAN's challenge.


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    Item Type: Preprint
    Additional Information: Forthcoming in Current Controversies in Experimental Philosophy edited by E. Machery and E. O'Neill and published by Routledge.
    Subjects: Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science
    Depositing User: Justin Sytsma
    Date Deposited: 07 Sep 2013 11:15
    Last Modified: 07 Sep 2013 11:15
    Item ID: 9987
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/9987

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