Confirmation for a Modest Realism
Snyder, Laura J. (2004) Confirmation for a Modest Realism. In [2004] Philosophy of Science Assoc. 19th Biennial Meeting - PSA2004: Contributed Papers (Austin, TX; 2004): PSA 2004 Contributed Papers.
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Abstract
William Whewell was clearly wrong to claim that his confirmation criterion of consilience was a truth-guarantor. I argue here, however, that even when consilience gives evidence for a theory that turns out to be false, there is an important sense in which consilience shows that the theory has gotten something right. Consilience is a sign that a theory has uncovered something about the natural-kind structure of the physical world. Because of this, Whewell was correct to claim that consilience provides a “criterion of reality.” In this way consilience can play a role in an argument for scientific realism.
| Keywords: | Consilience, Whewell, Realism |
|---|---|
| Subjects: | General Issues: Confirmation/Induction General Issues: History of Philosophy of Science General Issues: Realism/Anti-realism |
| Conferences and Volumes: | [2004] Philosophy of Science Assoc. 19th Biennial Meeting - PSA2004: Contributed Papers (Austin, TX; 2004): PSA 2004 Contributed Papers |
| ID Code: | 1901 |
| Deposited By: | Snyder, Laura J. |
| Deposited On: | 22 August 2004 |