Confirmation for a Modest Realism

Snyder, Laura J. (2004) Confirmation for a Modest Realism. In [2004] Philosophy of Science Assoc. 19th Biennial Meeting - PSA2004: Contributed Papers (Austin, TX; 2004): PSA 2004 Contributed Papers.

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Abstract

William Whewell was clearly wrong to claim that his confirmation criterion of consilience was a truth-guarantor. I argue here, however, that even when consilience gives evidence for a theory that turns out to be false, there is an important sense in which consilience shows that the theory has gotten something right. Consilience is a sign that a theory has uncovered something about the natural-kind structure of the physical world. Because of this, Whewell was correct to claim that consilience provides a “criterion of reality.” In this way consilience can play a role in an argument for scientific realism.

Keywords:Consilience, Whewell, Realism
Subjects:General Issues: Confirmation/Induction
General Issues: History of Philosophy of Science
General Issues: Realism/Anti-realism
Conferences and Volumes:[2004] Philosophy of Science Assoc. 19th Biennial Meeting - PSA2004: Contributed Papers (Austin, TX; 2004): PSA 2004 Contributed Papers
ID Code:1901
Deposited By:Snyder, Laura J.
Deposited On:22 August 2004