Snyder, Laura J. (2004) Confirmation for a Modest Realism. In: UNSPECIFIED. (Unpublished)
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Abstract
William Whewell was clearly wrong to claim that his confirmation criterion of consilience was a truth-guarantor. I argue here, however, that even when consilience gives evidence for a theory that turns out to be false, there is an important sense in which consilience shows that the theory has gotten something right. Consilience is a sign that a theory has uncovered something about the natural-kind structure of the physical world. Because of this, Whewell was correct to claim that consilience provides a “criterion of reality.” In this way consilience can play a role in an argument for scientific realism.
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| Item Type: | Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED) | ||||||
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| Keywords: | Consilience, Whewell, Realism | ||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Confirmation/Induction General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism |
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| Depositing User: | Laura J. Snyder | ||||||
| Date Deposited: | 22 Aug 2004 | ||||||
| Last Modified: | 07 Oct 2010 15:12 | ||||||
| Item ID: | 1901 | ||||||
| Public Domain: | No | ||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Confirmation/Induction General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism |
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| Date: | 2004 | ||||||
| URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/1901 |
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