Marcus, Russell (2007) Intrinsic Explanation and Field's Dispensabilist Strategy. In: UNSPECIFIED.

Preview

PDF Field_IE_RSS.pdf Download (69kB)

Abstract

Philosophy of mathematics for the last half-century has been dominated in one way or another by Quine’s indispensability argument. The argument alleges that our best scientific theory quantifies over, and thus commits us to, mathematical objects. In this paper, I present new considerations which undermine the most serious challenge to Quine’s argument, Hartry Field’s reformulation of Newtonian Gravitational Theory.

---

Export/Citation:

EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL

Social Networking:

Share |

---

Item Type:	Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Marcus, Russell
Keywords:	Field Indispensability Intrinsic Explanation Quine
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Mathematics General Issues > Reductionism/Holism General Issues > Explanation
Depositing User:	Russell Marcus
Date Deposited:	14 Feb 2008
Last Modified:	07 Oct 2010 15:16
Item ID:	3891
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Mathematics General Issues > Reductionism/Holism General Issues > Explanation
Date:	2007
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/3891

Monthly Views for the past 3 years

Monthly Downloads for the past 3 years

Plum Analytics

Actions (login required)

View Item