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Epistemic Diversity and Editor Decisions: A Statistical Matthew Effect

Heesen, Remco and Romeijn, Jan-Willem (2019) Epistemic Diversity and Editor Decisions: A Statistical Matthew Effect. Philosophers' Imprint.

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Abstract

This paper offers a new angle on the common idea that the process of science does not support epistemic diversity. Under minimal assumptions on the nature of journal editing we prove that editorial procedures, even when impartial in themselves, disadvantage less prominent research programs. This purely statistical bias in article selection further skews existing differences in the success rate and hence attractiveness of research programs, and exacerbates the reputation difference between the programs. After a discussion of the modeling assumptions, the paper ends with a number of recommendations that may help promote scientific diversity through editorial decision making.


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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Heesen, Remcoremco.heesen@uwa.edu.au0000-0003-3823-944X
Romeijn, Jan-Willemj.w.romeijn@rug.nl
Additional Information: This is the penultimate version of a paper that will be published (open access) by Philosophers' Imprint. Please cite from the published version if available.
Keywords: Philosophy of science; Social structure of science; Cognitive division of labor; Matthew effect; Social epistemology; Formal epistemology
Subjects: General Issues > Decision Theory
Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
General Issues > Science and Policy
General Issues > Social Epistemology of Science
General Issues > Theory Change
Depositing User: Remco Heesen
Date Deposited: 27 Jul 2019 11:56
Last Modified: 27 Jul 2019 11:56
Item ID: 16262
Journal or Publication Title: Philosophers' Imprint
Subjects: General Issues > Decision Theory
Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
General Issues > Science and Policy
General Issues > Social Epistemology of Science
General Issues > Theory Change
Date: 24 July 2019
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/16262

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