Dinh, Phuong (Phoebe) and Danks, David (2020) Causal Pluralism in Philosophy: Empirical Challenges and Alternative Proposals. In: UNSPECIFIED.
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Abstract
An increasing number of arguments for causal pluralism invoke empirical psychological data. Different aspects of causal cognition-specifically, causal perception and causal inference-are thought to involve distinct cognitive processes and representations, and they thereby distinctively support transference and dependency theories of causation, respectively. We argue that this dualistic picture of causal concepts arises from methodological differences, rather than from an actual plurality of concepts. Hence, philosophical causal pluralism is not particularly supported by the empirical data. Serious engagement with cognitive science reveals that the connection between psychological concepts of causation and philosophical notions is substantially more complicated than is traditionally presumed.
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| Item Type: | Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED) | |||||||||
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| Keywords: | Causal pluralism, Cognitive science, Causal perception, Causal inference, Metaphysics | |||||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Causation Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science General Issues > Experimentation General Issues > Operationalism/Instrumentalism |
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| Depositing User: | Phuong (Phoebe) Dinh | |||||||||
| Date Deposited: | 09 Jun 2020 02:26 | |||||||||
| Last Modified: | 09 Jun 2020 02:26 | |||||||||
| Item ID: | 17294 | |||||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Causation Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science General Issues > Experimentation General Issues > Operationalism/Instrumentalism |
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| Date: | 6 March 2020 | |||||||||
| URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/17294 |
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