Boge, Florian J. (2022) Back to Kant! QBism, Phenomenology, and Reality from Invariants. [Preprint]

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Abstract

As it stands, QBism faces two problems, an epistemic and a semantic one: That it is unclear how, on QBism, an agent can coherently abduce the existence of others and an external, mind-independent world, and that it is unclear how talk of that world even becomes meaningful within the QBist framework. I will here go into elements of phenomenology that could potentially help in solving these problems, but also into what I see as their limitations within 'phenomenology proper'. I will then go back to Kant, in whose writings some of these phenomenological ideas are rooted, and make a big leap forward, in suggesting a broadly 'neo-Kantian' constructivism that I believe evades both problems.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Boge, Florian J. fjboge@gmail.com 0000-0002-1030-3393
Additional Information:	This is a preprint of a paper forthcoming in Berghofer, P. & Wiltsche, H. A., "Phenomenology and QBism: New Approaches to Quantum Mechanics", Routledge.
Keywords:	QBism, Neo-Kantianism, Quantum Mechanics, Solipsism, Phenomenology, Realism
Subjects:	General Issues > Causation Specific Sciences > Physics > Quantum Mechanics General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism Specific Sciences > Physics > Symmetries/Invariances
Depositing User:	Mr Florian Boge
Date Deposited:	20 Dec 2022 14:05
Last Modified:	20 Dec 2022 14:05
Item ID:	21571
Subjects:	General Issues > Causation Specific Sciences > Physics > Quantum Mechanics General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism Specific Sciences > Physics > Symmetries/Invariances
Date:	2022
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/21571

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