Brunet, Tyler D. P. (2023) Categorial Modal Realism. [Preprint]

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Abstract

The current conception of the plurality of worlds is founded on a set theoretic understanding of possibilia. This paper provides an alternative category theoretic conception and argues that it is at least as serviceable for our understanding of possibilia. In addition to or instead of the notion of possibilia conceived as possible objects or possible individuals, this alternative to set theoretic modal realism requires the notion of possible morphisms, conceived as possible changes, processes or transformations. To support this alternative conception of the plurality of worlds, I provide two examples where a category theoretic account can do work traditionally done by the set theoretic account: one on modal logic and another on paradoxes of size. I argue that the categorial account works at least as well as the set theoretic account, and moreover suggest that it has something to add in each case: it makes apparent avenues of inquiry that were obscured, if not invisible, on the set theoretic account. I conclude with a plea for epistemological humility about our acceptance of either a category-like or set-like realist ontology of modality.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Brunet, Tyler D. P. t.d.p.brunet@exeter.ac.uk 0000-0002-7609-7254
Keywords:	Modality; Possible Worlds; Category Theory; Modal Logic; Humility
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Logic General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Depositing User:	Dr. Tyler D. P. Brunet
Date Deposited:	05 Jan 2023 13:34
Last Modified:	05 Jan 2023 13:34
Item ID:	21622
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Logic General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Date:	1 January 2023
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/21622

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