PhilSci Archive

Scientific Cumulativity and Conceptual Change: The Case of 'Temperature'

Norsen, Travis (2010) Scientific Cumulativity and Conceptual Change: The Case of 'Temperature'. [Preprint]

This is the latest version of this item.

[img]
Preview
 PDF
temperature.pdf
Download (221kB)

Abstract

I examine the historical development of the concept ``temperature'' from the point of view of questions about the stability of concepts during episodes of theory change. It is argued that the concept retains its identity and meaning through two quite radical developments in surrounding theory, even while these developments uncover novel fundamental characteristics of ``temperature'' and allow new associated definitions for the concept. I then indicate some of the differing underlying philosophical views which have caused others to view this kind of case very differently, and finally suggest a number of features that I think a theory of concepts would need to possess in order to account for the important aspects of the presented case-study.

Export/Citation: EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL
Social Networking:
Share |
Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Norsen, Travis
Keywords: concepts, induction, reference, thermodynamics
Subjects: General Issues > Theory Change
General Issues > History of Science Case Studies
Specific Sciences > Physics > Statistical Mechanics/Thermodynamics
Depositing User: Travis Norsen
Date Deposited: 14 Oct 2010 11:17
Last Modified: 14 Oct 2010 11:17
Item ID: 8332
Subjects: General Issues > Theory Change
General Issues > History of Science Case Studies
Specific Sciences > Physics > Statistical Mechanics/Thermodynamics
Date: September 2010
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/8332

Available Versions of this Item

Monthly Views for the past 3 years

Monthly Downloads for the past 3 years

Plum Analytics

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item