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Expertise and Intuitions about Reference

Machery, Edouard (2012) Expertise and Intuitions about Reference. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 27 (1). pp. 37-54. ISSN 2171-679X

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Many philosophers hold that experts’ semantic intuitions are more reliable and provide better evidence than lay people’s intuitions – a thesis commonly called “the Expertise Defense.” Focusing on the intuitions about the reference of proper names, this article critically assesses the Expertise Defense.

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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Additional Information: ISSN: 0495-4548 (print)
Keywords: intuitions; reference; descriptivism; causal-historical theories; Kripke; expertise; bias; experimental philosophy
Depositing User: Users 15304 not found.
Date Deposited: 04 Feb 2014 23:16
Last Modified: 04 Feb 2014 23:16
Item ID: 10258
Journal or Publication Title: THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science
Publisher: Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco
Official URL:
DOI or Unique Handle: 10.1387/theoria.3482
Date: January 2012
Page Range: pp. 37-54
Volume: 27
Number: 1
ISSN: 2171-679X

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