Machery, Edouard (2012) Expertise and Intuitions about Reference. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 27 (1). pp. 37-54. ISSN 2171-679X

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Abstract

Many philosophers hold that experts’ semantic intuitions are more reliable and provide better evidence than lay people’s intuitions – a thesis commonly called “the Expertise Defense.” Focusing on the intuitions about the reference of proper names, this article critically assesses the Expertise Defense.

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Item Type:	Published Article or Volume
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Machery, Edouard machery@pitt.edu
Additional Information:	ISSN: 0495-4548 (print)
Keywords:	intuitions; reference; descriptivism; causal-historical theories; Kripke; expertise; bias; experimental philosophy
Depositing User:	Users 15304 not found.
Date Deposited:	04 Feb 2014 23:16
Last Modified:	04 Feb 2014 23:16
Item ID:	10258
Journal or Publication Title:	THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science
Publisher:	Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco
Official URL:	http://www.ehu.es/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/vi...
DOI or Unique Handle:	10.1387/theoria.3482
Date:	January 2012
Page Range:	pp. 37-54
Volume:	27
Number:	1
ISSN:	2171-679X
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10258

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