Le Bihan, Baptiste (2014) No-Futurism and Metaphysical Contingentism. [Preprint]
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Abstract
According to no-futurism, past and present entities are real, but future ones are not. This view faces a skeptical challenge (Bourne 2002, 2006, Braddon-Mitchell, 2004): if no-futurism is true, how do you know you are present? I shall propose a new skeptical argument based on the physical possibility of Gödelian worlds (1949). This argument shows that a no-futurist has to endorse a metaphysical contingentist reading of no-futurism, the view that no-futurism is contingently true. But then, the no-futurist has to face a new skeptical challenge: how do you know that you are in a no-futurist world?
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Item Type: | Preprint | ||||||
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Additional Information: | Penultimate draft of a paper in Axiomathes, published by Springer. | ||||||
Keywords: | Ontology; space-time; growing block; metaphysical contingentism | ||||||
Subjects: | Specific Sciences > Physics > Cosmology General Issues > Philosophers of Science |
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Depositing User: | Dr. Baptiste Le Bihan | ||||||
Date Deposited: | 13 May 2014 07:40 | ||||||
Last Modified: | 13 May 2014 07:40 | ||||||
Item ID: | 10669 | ||||||
Official URL: | http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10516-01... | ||||||
DOI or Unique Handle: | 10.1007/s10516-014-9236-9 | ||||||
Subjects: | Specific Sciences > Physics > Cosmology General Issues > Philosophers of Science |
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Date: | 2014 | ||||||
URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10669 |
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