Le Bihan, Baptiste (2014) No-Futurism and Metaphysical Contingentism. [Preprint]

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Abstract

According to no-futurism, past and present entities are real, but future ones are not. This view faces a skeptical challenge (Bourne 2002, 2006, Braddon-Mitchell, 2004): if no-futurism is true, how do you know you are present? I shall propose a new skeptical argument based on the physical possibility of Gödelian worlds (1949). This argument shows that a no-futurist has to endorse a metaphysical contingentist reading of no-futurism, the view that no-futurism is contingently true. But then, the no-futurist has to face a new skeptical challenge: how do you know that you are in a no-futurist world?

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Le Bihan, Baptiste baptiste.le.bihan@hotmail.fr
Additional Information:	Penultimate draft of a paper in Axiomathes, published by Springer.
Keywords:	Ontology; space-time; growing block; metaphysical contingentism
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Physics > Cosmology General Issues > Philosophers of Science
Depositing User:	Dr. Baptiste Le Bihan
Date Deposited:	13 May 2014 07:40
Last Modified:	13 May 2014 07:40
Item ID:	10669
Official URL:	http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10516-01...
DOI or Unique Handle:	10.1007/s10516-014-9236-9
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Physics > Cosmology General Issues > Philosophers of Science
Date:	2014
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10669

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