Benétreau-Dupin, Yann (2014) Blurring Out Cosmic Puzzles. In: UNSPECIFIED.

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Abstract

The Doomsday argument and anthropic arguments are illustrations of a paradox. In both cases, a lack of knowledge apparently yields surprising conclusions. Since they are formulated within a Bayesian framework, the paradox constitutes a challenge to Bayesianism. Several attempts, some successful, have been made to avoid these conclusions, but some versions of the paradox cannot be dissolved within the framework of orthodox Bayesianism. I show that adopting an imprecise framework of probabilistic reasoning allows for a more adequate representation of ignorance in Bayesian reasoning, and explains away these puzzles.

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Item Type:	Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Benétreau-Dupin, Yann ybenetre@uwo.ca
Keywords:	ignorance; principle of indifference; imprecise probabilities; Doomsday argument; cosmological constant
Subjects:	General Issues > Confirmation/Induction Specific Sciences > Physics > Cosmology Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
Depositing User:	Dr. Yann Benétreau-Dupin
Date Deposited:	03 Jul 2014 13:44
Last Modified:	03 Jul 2014 13:44
Item ID:	10817
Subjects:	General Issues > Confirmation/Induction Specific Sciences > Physics > Cosmology Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
Date:	June 2014
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10817

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