Huber, Franz (2014) For True Conditionalizers Weisberg's Paradox is a False Alarm. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Weisberg (2009) introduces a phenomenon he terms perceptual undermining. He argues that it poses a problem for Jeffrey conditionalization (Jeffrey 1983), and Bayesian epistemology in general. This is Weisberg’s paradox. Weisberg (2014) argues that perceptual undermining also poses a problem for ranking theory (Spohn 2012) and for Dempster-Shafer theory (Shafer 1976). In this note I argue that perceptual undermining does not pose a problem for any of these theories: for true conditionalizers Weisberg’s paradox is a false alarm.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Huber, Franz franz.huber@utoronto.ca
Subjects:	General Issues > Confirmation/Induction General Issues > Decision Theory Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics General Issues > Theory Change
Depositing User:	Unnamed user with email franz.huber@utoronto.ca
Date Deposited:	09 Jul 2014 14:08
Last Modified:	09 Jul 2014 14:08
Item ID:	10830
Subjects:	General Issues > Confirmation/Induction General Issues > Decision Theory Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics General Issues > Theory Change
Date:	2014
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10830

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