Broessel, Peter and Huber, Franz (2014) Bayesian Confirmation: A Means With No End. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
|
PDF
Bayesian_Confirmation_final.pdf Download (202kB) |
Abstract
Any theory of confirmation must answer the following question: what is the purpose of its conception of confirmation for scientific inquiry? In this paper we argue that no Bayesian conception of confirmation can be used for its primary intended purpose, which we take to be saying how worthy of belief various hypotheses are. Then we consider a different use Bayesian confirmation might be put to, namely to determine the epistemic value of experimental outcomes, and thus to decide which experiments to carry out. Interestingly Bayesian confirmation theorists rule out that confirmation be used for this purpose. We conclude that Bayesian confirmation is a means with no end.
Export/Citation: | EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL |
Social Networking: |
Item Type: | Published Article or Volume | |||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Creators: |
|
|||||||||
Subjects: | General Issues > Confirmation/Induction General Issues > Decision Theory Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics General Issues > Theory Change |
|||||||||
Depositing User: | Unnamed user with email franz.huber@utoronto.ca | |||||||||
Date Deposited: | 09 Jul 2014 14:13 | |||||||||
Last Modified: | 09 Jul 2014 14:13 | |||||||||
Item ID: | 10834 | |||||||||
Journal or Publication Title: | British Journal for the Philosophy of Science | |||||||||
Publisher: | OUP | |||||||||
Official URL: | http://bjps.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2014/... | |||||||||
Subjects: | General Issues > Confirmation/Induction General Issues > Decision Theory Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics General Issues > Theory Change |
|||||||||
Date: | 2014 | |||||||||
URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10834 |
Monthly Views for the past 3 years
Monthly Downloads for the past 3 years
Plum Analytics
Actions (login required)
View Item |