Huber, Franz (2014) What Should I Believe About What Would Have Been the Case? Journal of Philosophicl Logic.
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Abstract
The question I am addressing in this paper is the following: how is it possible to empirically test, or confirm, counterfactuals? After motivating this question in section 1, I will look at two approaches to counterfactuals, and at how counterfactuals can be empirically tested, or confirmed, if at all, on these accounts in section 2. I will then digress into the philosophy of probability in section 3. The reason for this digression is that I want to use the way observable absolute and relative frequencies, two empirical notions, are used to empirically test, or confirm, hypotheses about objective chances, a metaphysical notion, as a role-model. Specifically, I want to use this probabilistic account of the testing of chance hypotheses as a role-model for the account of the testing of counterfactuals, another metaphysical notion, that I will present in sections 4 to 8. I will conclude by comparing my proposal to one non-probabilistic and one probabilistic alternative in section 9.
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Item Type: | Published Article or Volume | ||||||
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Subjects: | General Issues > Causation General Issues > Confirmation/Induction General Issues > Decision Theory General Issues > Formal Learning Theory Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics General Issues > Theory Change |
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Depositing User: | Unnamed user with email franz.huber@utoronto.ca | ||||||
Date Deposited: | 09 Jul 2014 14:15 | ||||||
Last Modified: | 09 Jul 2014 14:15 | ||||||
Item ID: | 10836 | ||||||
Journal or Publication Title: | Journal of Philosophicl Logic | ||||||
Publisher: | Springer | ||||||
Official URL: | http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10992-01... | ||||||
Subjects: | General Issues > Causation General Issues > Confirmation/Induction General Issues > Decision Theory General Issues > Formal Learning Theory Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics General Issues > Theory Change |
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Date: | 2014 | ||||||
URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10836 |
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