Dizadji-Bahmani, Foad and Bradley, Seamus (2014) Lewis' Account of Counterfactuals is Incongruent with Lewis' Account of Laws of Nature. In: UNSPECIFIED.
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Abstract
In this paper we argue that there is a problem with the conjunction of David Lewis' account of counterfactual conditionals and his account of laws of nature. This is a pressing problem since both accounts are individually plausible, and popular.
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Item Type: | Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED) | |||||||||
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Keywords: | counterfactuals, lewis, laws of nature | |||||||||
Subjects: | General Issues > Laws of Nature | |||||||||
Depositing User: | Dr. Seamus Bradley | |||||||||
Date Deposited: | 14 Jul 2014 18:27 | |||||||||
Last Modified: | 14 Jul 2014 18:27 | |||||||||
Item ID: | 10875 | |||||||||
Subjects: | General Issues > Laws of Nature | |||||||||
Date: | 2014 | |||||||||
URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10875 |
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