Ross, Lauren N. (2014) Dynamical Models and Explanation in Neuroscience. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Kaplan and Craver claim that all explanations in neuroscience appeal to mechanisms. They extend this view to the use of mathematical models in neuroscience and propose a constraint such models must meet in order to be explanatory. I analyze a mathematical model used to provide explanations in dynamical systems neuroscience and indicate how this explanation cannot be accommodated by the mechanist framework. I argue that this explanation is well characterized by Batterman’s account of minimal model explanations and that it demonstrates how relationships between explanatory models in neuroscience and the systems they represent is more complex than has been appreciated.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Ross, Lauren N. lnr18@pitt.edu
Additional Information:	Pre-referee eprint Forthcoming in Philosophy of Science
Keywords:	explanation, neuroscience, dynamical systems, mechanist, mechanism
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Complex Systems General Issues > Explanation Specific Sciences > Neuroscience
Depositing User:	Lauren N. Ross
Date Deposited:	13 Aug 2014 15:24
Last Modified:	13 Aug 2014 15:24
Item ID:	10946
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Complex Systems General Issues > Explanation Specific Sciences > Neuroscience
Date:	7 March 2014
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10946

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