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A Game-Theoretic Approach to Peer Disagreement

Heesen, Remco and van der Kolk, Pieter (2014) A Game-Theoretic Approach to Peer Disagreement. [Preprint]

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Abstract

In this paper we propose and analyze a game-theoretic model of the epistemology of peer disagreement. In this model, the peers' rationality is evaluated in terms of their probability of ending the disagreement with a true belief. We find that different strategies---in particular, one based on the Steadfast View and one based on the Conciliatory View---are rational depending on the truth-sensitivity of the individuals involved in the disagreement. Interestingly, the Steadfast and the Conciliatory Views can even be rational simultaneously in some circumstances. We tentatively provide some reasons to favor the Conciliatory View in such cases. We argue that the game-theoretic perspective is a fruitful one in this debate, and this fruitfulness has not been exhausted by the present paper.

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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Heesen, Remcorheesen@andrew.cmu.edu
van der Kolk, Pieterp.m.van.der.kolk@rug.nl
Keywords: peer disagreement rationality social epistemology game theory
Subjects: General Issues > Decision Theory
Depositing User: Remco Heesen
Date Deposited: 23 Oct 2014 15:05
Last Modified: 22 Jan 2016 15:34
Item ID: 11074
Subjects: General Issues > Decision Theory
Date: 21 October 2014
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/11074

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