McCutcheon, Randall G. (2014) Rational credences are private. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Anti-expertise, or self-defeating belief, leads to incoherent personal credences. Some philosophers think that anti-expertise is irrational but avoidable (probabilism), others think that some cases of anti-expertise are rational (anti-probabilism), and still others think that anti-expertise is irrational and unavoidable (nihilism about rationality). Taking as premises some standard assumptions about the Sleeping Beauty Problem, I prove that if Beauty maintains public credences then she is prone to anti-expertise unless she embraces optimism, i.e. denies that she will experience multiple awakenings if tails.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID McCutcheon, Randall G. rmcctchn@memphis.edu
Keywords:	Anti-expertise, incoherent credences, probabilism, Sleeping Beauty, optimism, Newcomb paradox
Subjects:	General Issues > Decision Theory
Depositing User:	Dr. Randall G. McCutcheon
Date Deposited:	08 Dec 2014 02:01
Last Modified:	08 Dec 2014 02:01
Item ID:	11184
Subjects:	General Issues > Decision Theory
Date:	3 December 2014
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/11184

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