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When Does ‘Folk Psychology’ Count as Folk Psychological?

Hochstein, Eric (2014) When Does ‘Folk Psychology’ Count as Folk Psychological? [Preprint]

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Abstract

It has commonly been argued that certain types of mental descriptions, specifically those characterized in terms of propositional attitudes, are part of a folk psychological understanding of the mind. Recently, however, it has also been argued that this is the case even when such descriptions are employed as part of scientific theories in domains like social psychology and comparative psychology. In this paper, I argue that there is no plausible way to understand the distinction between folk and scientific psychology that can support such claims. Moreover, these sorts of claims can have adverse consequences for the neuroscientific study of the brain by downplaying the value of many psychological theories that provide information neuroscientists need in order to build and test neurological models.

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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Hochstein, Ericeghochst@gmail.com
Keywords: folk psychology; scientific psychology; propositional attitudes; natural kinds
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science
Specific Sciences > Psychology
General Issues > Science vs. Pseudoscience
Depositing User: Dr. Eric Hochstein
Date Deposited: 24 Oct 2015 22:59
Last Modified: 25 Mar 2016 02:10
Item ID: 11716
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science
Specific Sciences > Psychology
General Issues > Science vs. Pseudoscience
Date: 2014
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/11716

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