Andersen, Holly (2016) The Hodgsonian account of temporal experience. [Preprint]

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Abstract

This chapter offers a overview of Shadworth Hodgson's account of experience as fundamentally temporal, an account that was deeply influential on thinkers such as William James and which prefigures the phenomenology of Husserl in many ways. I highlight eight key features that are characteristic of Hodgson's account, and how they hang together to provide a coherent overall picture of experience and knowledge. Hodgson's account is then compared to Husserl's, and I argue that Hodgson's account offers a better target for projects such as neurophenomenology than does Husserl's. Hodgson's account is historically important as a culmination of a certain trajectory of British Empiricist thought. It offers a substantive alternative for how to think about temporality and experience in contemporary discussions, not just of the present moment but of the relationship between experience and knowledge more broadly.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Andersen, Holly holly_andersen@sfu.ca
Keywords:	Hodgson, present, temporal experience, Husserl, phenomenology, neurophenomenology
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science Specific Sciences > Psychology
Depositing User:	Dr. Holly Andersen
Date Deposited:	26 Aug 2016 19:50
Last Modified:	26 Aug 2016 19:50
Item ID:	12388
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science Specific Sciences > Psychology
Date:	2016
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/12388

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