Reutlinger, Alexander (2016) Explanation Beyond Causation? New Directions in the Philosophy of Scientific Explanation. [Preprint]
There is a more recent version of this item available. |
|
Text
Reutlinger Explanation_Beyond_Causation Phil Compass_philsci_archive.pdf Download (276kB) | Preview |
Abstract
In this paper, I aim to provide access to the current debate on non-causal explanations in philosophy of sciences. I will first present examples of non-causal explanations in the sciences. Then, I will outline three alternative approaches to non-causal explanations – that is, causal reductionism, pluralism and monism – and, corresponding to these three approaches, different strategies for distinguishing between causal and non-causal explanation. Finally, I will raise questions for future research on non-causal explanations.
Export/Citation: | EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL |
Social Networking: |
Item Type: | Preprint | ||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Creators: |
|
||||||
Additional Information: | forthcoming in Philosophy Compass | ||||||
Keywords: | scientific explanation, non-causal explanation, mathematical explanation, causal explanation | ||||||
Subjects: | General Issues > Causation General Issues > Explanation General Issues > Models and Idealization |
||||||
Depositing User: | Alexander Reutlinger | ||||||
Date Deposited: | 25 Oct 2016 13:05 | ||||||
Last Modified: | 25 Oct 2016 13:05 | ||||||
Item ID: | 12514 | ||||||
Subjects: | General Issues > Causation General Issues > Explanation General Issues > Models and Idealization |
||||||
Date: | 2016 | ||||||
URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/12514 |
Available Versions of this Item
- Explanation Beyond Causation? New Directions in the Philosophy of Scientific Explanation. (deposited 25 Oct 2016 13:05) [Currently Displayed]
Monthly Views for the past 3 years
Monthly Downloads for the past 3 years
Plum Analytics
Actions (login required)
View Item |