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Explanation Beyond Causation? New Directions in the Philosophy of Scientific Explanation

Reutlinger, Alexander (2016) Explanation Beyond Causation? New Directions in the Philosophy of Scientific Explanation. [Preprint]

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Abstract

In this paper, I aim to provide access to the current debate on non-causal explanations in philosophy of sciences. I will first present examples of non-causal explanations in the sciences. Then, I will outline three alternative approaches to non-causal explanations – that is, causal reductionism, pluralism and monism – and, corresponding to these three approaches, different strategies for distinguishing between causal and non-causal explanation. Finally, I will raise questions for future research on non-causal explanations.

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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Reutlinger, AlexanderAlexander.Reutlinger@lrz.uni-muenchen.de
Additional Information: forthcoming in Philosophy Compass
Keywords: scientific explanation, non-causal explanation, mathematical explanation, causal explanation
Subjects: General Issues > Causation
General Issues > Explanation
General Issues > Models and Idealization
Depositing User: Alexander Reutlinger
Date Deposited: 25 Oct 2016 13:05
Last Modified: 25 Oct 2016 13:05
Item ID: 12514
Subjects: General Issues > Causation
General Issues > Explanation
General Issues > Models and Idealization
Date: 2016
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/12514

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