Lewis, Peter J. and Fallis, Don (2016) Accuracy, conditionalization, and probabilism. In: UNSPECIFIED.

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Abstract

Accuracy-based arguments for conditionalization and probabilism appear to have a significant advantage over their Dutch Book rivals. They rely only on the plausible epistemic norm that one should try to decrease the inaccuracy of one's beliefs. Furthermore, it seems that conditionalization and probabilism follow from a wide range of measures of inaccuracy. However, we argue that among the measures in the literature, there are some from which one can prove conditionalization, others from which one can prove probabilism, and none from which one can prove both. Hence at present, the accuracy-based approach cannot underwrite both conditionalization and probabilism.

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Item Type:	Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Lewis, Peter J. plewis@miami.edu Fallis, Don fallis@email.arizona.edu
Keywords:	Accuracy, probabilism, conditionalization, epistemic utility
Subjects:	General Issues > Decision Theory
Depositing User:	Peter J. Lewis
Date Deposited:	26 Oct 2016 12:58
Last Modified:	26 Oct 2016 12:58
Item ID:	12517
Subjects:	General Issues > Decision Theory
Date:	3 March 2016
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/12517

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• Accuracy, conditionalization, and probabilism. (deposited 26 Oct 2016 12:58) [Currently Displayed]
  • Accuracy, conditionalization, and probabilism. (deposited 24 Mar 2020 01:28)

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