Mizrahi, Moti (2018) The “Positive Argument” for Constructive Empiricism and Inference to the Best Explanation. [Preprint]

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Abstract

In this paper, I argue that the “positive argument” for Constructive Empiricism (CE), according to which CE “makes better sense of science, and of scientific activity, than realism does” (van Fraassen 1980, 73), is an Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE). But constructive empiricists are critical of IBE, and thus they have to be critical of their own “positive argument” for CE. If my argument is sound, then constructive empiricists are in the awkward position of having to reject their own “positive argument” for CE by their own lights.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Mizrahi, Moti motimizra@gmail.com
Additional Information:	Forthcoming in Journal for General Philosophy of Science
Keywords:	Constructive Empiricism; Inference to the Best Explanation; Positive Argument; Scientific Realism
Subjects:	General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Depositing User:	Dr. Moti Mizrahi
Date Deposited:	06 Apr 2018 15:23
Last Modified:	06 Apr 2018 15:23
Item ID:	14532
Subjects:	General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Date:	5 April 2018
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/14532

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