Colombo, Matteo and Elkin, Lee and Hartmann, Stephan (2018) Being Realist about Bayes, and the Predictive Processing Theory of Mind. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Some naturalistic philosophers of mind subscribing to the predictive processing theory of mind have adopted a realist attitude towards the results of Bayesian cognitive science. In this paper, we argue that this realist attitude is unwarranted. The Bayesian research program in cognitive science does not possess special epistemic virtues over alternative approaches for explaining mental phenomena involving uncertainty. In particular, the Bayesian approach is not simpler, more unifying, or more rational than alternatives. It is also contentious that the Bayesian approach is overall better supported by the empirical evidence. So, to develop philosophical theories of mind on the basis of a realist interpretation of results from Bayesian cognitive science is unwarranted. Naturalistic philosophers of mind should instead adopt an anti-realist attitude towards these results and remain agnostic as to whether Bayesian models are true. For continuing on with an exclusive focus and praise of Bayes within debates about the predictive processing theory will impede progress in philosophical understanding of scientific practice in computational cognitive science as well as of the architecture of the mind.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Colombo, Matteo m.colombo@uvt.nl Elkin, Lee ljelkin3@gmail.com Hartmann, Stephan s.hartmann@lmu.de 0000-0001-8676-2177
Keywords:	Bayesian cognitive science; representing uncertainty; naturalistic philosophy of mind; scientific realism; underdetermination thesis
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science General Issues > Confirmation/Induction General Issues > Models and Idealization Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
Depositing User:	Dr. Lee Elkin
Date Deposited:	30 Jul 2018 19:05
Last Modified:	12 Jul 2024 17:23
Item ID:	14908
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science General Issues > Confirmation/Induction General Issues > Models and Idealization Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
Date:	19 July 2018
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/14908

Available Versions of this Item

• Being Realist about Bayes, and the Predictive Processing Theory of Mind. (deposited 12 Feb 2018 14:03)
  • Being Realist about Bayes, and the Predictive Processing Theory of Mind. (deposited 09 Jun 2018 18:46)
    • Being Realist about Bayes, and the Predictive Processing Theory of Mind. (deposited 30 Jul 2018 19:05) [Currently Displayed]

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