Borge, Bruno (2018) Epistemic structural realism, modality and laws of nature. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 33 (3). pp. 447-468. ISSN 2171-679X
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Abstract
According to epistemic structural realism (EER) scientific theories provide us only with knowledge about the structure of the unobservable world, but not about its nature. The most significant objection that this posi- tion has faced is the so-called Newman’s problem. In this paper I offer an alternative objection to EER. I argue that its formulation leads to undesirable skeptical positions in two fields close to scientific realism: the debates on modality and laws of nature. I also show that there is an interesting sense in which my objection is stronger than the one offered by Newman.
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Item Type: | Published Article or Volume | ||||||
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Additional Information: | ISSN: 0495-4548 (print) | ||||||
Keywords: | Scientific Realism; Structural Realism; Modal Realism; Nomological Realism. | ||||||
Subjects: | General Issues > Laws of Nature General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism |
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Depositing User: | Unnamed user with email theoria@ehu.es | ||||||
Date Deposited: | 17 Dec 2018 17:46 | ||||||
Last Modified: | 17 Dec 2018 17:46 | ||||||
Item ID: | 15443 | ||||||
Journal or Publication Title: | THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science | ||||||
Publisher: | Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco | ||||||
Official URL: | http://www.ehu.eus/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/v... | ||||||
DOI or Unique Handle: | 10.1387/theoria.18969 | ||||||
Subjects: | General Issues > Laws of Nature General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism |
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Date: | September 2018 | ||||||
Page Range: | pp. 447-468 | ||||||
Volume: | 33 | ||||||
Number: | 3 | ||||||
ISSN: | 2171-679X | ||||||
URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/15443 |
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