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Productive Theory-Ladenness in fMRI

Aktunc, M. Emrah (2019) Productive Theory-Ladenness in fMRI. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Several developments for diverse scientific goals, mostly in physics and physiology, had to take place, which eventually gave us fMRI as one of the central research paradigms of contemporary cognitive neuroscience. This technique stands on solid foundations established by the physics of magnetic resonance and the physiology of hemodynamics and is complimented by computational and statistical techniques. I argue, and support using concrete examples, that these foundations give rise to a productive theory-ladenness in fMRI, which enables researchers to identify and control for the types of methodological and inferential errors that may arise in the use of fMRI. Consequently, this makes it possible for researchers to represent and investigate cognitive phenomena in terms of hemodynamic data and for experimental knowledge to grow independently of large scale theories of cognition.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Aktunc, M. Emrahemrah.aktunc@ozyegin.edu.tr0000-0002-4387-3990
Keywords: productive theory-ladenness; fMRI; error; experimental knowledge; cognitive neuroscience
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science
General Issues > Experimentation
General Issues > Operationalism/Instrumentalism
General Issues > Philosophers of Science
Specific Sciences > Psychology
General Issues > Technology
General Issues > Theory/Observation
Depositing User: Dr M. Emrah Aktunc
Date Deposited: 05 Feb 2019 15:14
Last Modified: 05 Feb 2019 15:14
Item ID: 15712
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science
General Issues > Experimentation
General Issues > Operationalism/Instrumentalism
General Issues > Philosophers of Science
Specific Sciences > Psychology
General Issues > Technology
General Issues > Theory/Observation
Date: 5 January 2019
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/15712

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