Veit, Walter and Dewhurst, Joe and Dolega, Krzysztof and Jones, Max and Stanley, Shaun and Frankish, Keith and Dennett, Daniel C.
(2019)
The Rationale of Rationalization.
[Preprint]
Abstract
Fiery Cushman argues that “[r]ationalization is designed not to accurately infer unconscious mental states, but to construct new ones; it is not a discovery, but a fiction”. While we agree in broad strokes with the characterization of rationalization as a ‘useful fiction’, we think that Cushman’s claim remains ambiguous in two crucial respects: (i) the reality of beliefs and desires, i.e. the fictional status of folk psychological entities, and (ii) the degree to which they should be understood as useful and representative. Our aim here is to clarify both points and illuminate how rationalization could be understood as a useful fiction. In doing so, we aim to explicate the Rationale of Rationalization.
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