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Epistemic Decision Theory’s Reckoning

Mayo-Wilson, Conor and Wheeler, Gregory (2015) Epistemic Decision Theory’s Reckoning. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Epistemic decision theory (EDT) employs the mathematical tools of rational choice theory to justify epistemic norms, including probabilism, conditionalization, and the Principal Principle, among others.
Practitioners of EDT endorse two theses: (1) epistemic value is distinct from subjective preference, and (2) belief and epistemic value can be numerically quantified. We argue the first thesis, which we call epistemic puritanism, undermines the second.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Mayo-Wilson, Conorconormw@gmail.com
Wheeler, Gregorygregory.r.wheeler@gmail.com
Keywords: Probabilism, Accuracy, Utility Theory
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Values
General Issues > Decision Theory
Specific Sciences > Economics
Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
Depositing User: Gregory Wheeler
Date Deposited: 28 Aug 2019 15:04
Last Modified: 28 Aug 2019 15:04
Item ID: 16374
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Values
General Issues > Decision Theory
Specific Sciences > Economics
Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
Date: 2015
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/16374

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