Becklloyd, Dan and Sytsma, Justin
(2019)
Simulating Metaethics: Consensus and the Independence of Moral Beliefs.
[Preprint]
Abstract
In a series of recent articles, Shaun Nichols (2019a, 2019b; Ayars & Nichols 2019) has called on statistical learning to offer a process vindication argument for lay metaethical beliefs. His argument proposes that people are sensitive to consensus information in forming metaethical beliefs and contends that calling on consensus information in this way is rational. This vindication of lay metaethical beliefs hinges on a number of substantive assumptions, however, including that people’s first-order beliefs are to a large extent independent. In this paper, we raise concerns about this assumption. We argue that if people do call on consensus information in forming second-order beliefs, and if they maintain consistency between their first-order beliefs and their second-order beliefs, then independence will be threatened by the use of the very process at issue. This is tested through a series of computer simulations.
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