Broessel, Peter
(2015)
Keynes’s Coefficient of Dependence Revisited.
Erkenntnis, 80 (3).
pp. 521-553.
ISSN 0165-0106
Abstract
Probabilistic dependence and independence are among the key concepts of Bayesian epistemology. This paper focuses on the study of one specific quantitative notion of probabilistic dependence. More specifically, section 1 introduces Keynes’s coefficient of dependence and shows how it is related to pivotal aspects of scientific reasoning such as confirmation, coherence, the explanatory and unificatory power of theories, and the diversity of evidence. The intimate connection between Keynes’s coefficient of dependence and scientific reasoning raises the question of how Keynes’s coefficient of dependence is related to truth, and how it can be made fruitful for epistemological considerations. This question is answered in section 2 of the paper. Section 3 outlines the consequences the results have for epistemology and the philosophy of science from a Bayesian point of view.
Item Type: |
Published Article or Volume
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Creators: |
Creators | Email | ORCID |
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Broessel, Peter | | |
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Keywords: |
Correlation, Bayesian Epistemology, Coherence, Confirmation, Unification |
Depositing User: |
Dr Peter Brössel
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Date Deposited: |
14 Oct 2019 03:52 |
Last Modified: |
14 Oct 2019 03:52 |
Item ID: |
16529 |
Journal or Publication Title: |
Erkenntnis |
Publisher: |
Springer (Springer Science+Business Media B.V.) |
Official URL: |
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10670-0... |
Date: |
2015 |
Page Range: |
pp. 521-553 |
Volume: |
80 |
Number: |
3 |
ISSN: |
0165-0106 |
URI: |
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/16529 |
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