Gozzano, Simone (2017) The Compatibility of Downward Causation and Emergence. Philosophical and Scientific Perspectives on Downward Causation. pp. 296-312.
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Abstract
In this paper, I shall argue that both emergence and downward causation, which are strongly interconnected, presuppose the presence of levels of reality. However, emergence and downward causation pull in opposite directions with respect to my best reconstruction of what levels are. The upshot is that emergence stresses the autonomy among levels while downward causation puts the distinction between levels at risk of a reductio ad absurdum, with the further consequence of blurring the very notion of downward. Therefore, emergence and downward causation are not fit to each other vis-a-vis the concept of level.
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Item Type: | Published Article or Volume | ||||||
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Keywords: | emergent properties; law; level; downward causation; causal powers. | ||||||
Subjects: | General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics General Issues > Causation General Issues > Determinism/Indeterminism General Issues > Laws of Nature General Issues > Natural Kinds |
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Depositing User: | Dr. Simone Gozzano | ||||||
Date Deposited: | 04 Jan 2020 02:12 | ||||||
Last Modified: | 04 Jan 2020 02:12 | ||||||
Item ID: | 16778 | ||||||
Journal or Publication Title: | Philosophical and Scientific Perspectives on Downward Causation | ||||||
Publisher: | Routledge | ||||||
Subjects: | General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics General Issues > Causation General Issues > Determinism/Indeterminism General Issues > Laws of Nature General Issues > Natural Kinds |
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Date: | 2017 | ||||||
Page Range: | pp. 296-312 | ||||||
URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/16778 |
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