Antony, Louise (2020) Not rational, but not brutely causal either: A reply to Fodor on concept acquisition. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 35 (1). pp. 45-57. ISSN 2171-679X
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Abstract
Jerry Fodor has argued that concept acquisition cannot be a psychological or “rational-causal” process, but can only be a “brute-causal” process of acquisition. This position generates the “doorknob → DOORKNOB” problem: why are concepts typically acquired on the basis of experience with items in their extensions? I argue that Fodor’s taxonomy of causal processes needs supplementation, and characterize a third type: what I call “intelligible-causal processes.” Armed with this new category I present what I regard as a better response than Fodor’s to the doorknob → DOORKNOB problem.
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| Item Type: | Published Article or Volume | ||||||
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| Additional Information: | ISSN: 0495-4548 (print) | ||||||
| Keywords: | concept; nativism; acquisition; representation; rational-causal; brute-causal; intelligible-causal | ||||||
| Subjects: | Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Concepts and Representations Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Learning and Memory General Issues > Philosophers of Science |
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| Depositing User: | Unnamed user with email theoria@ehu.es | ||||||
| Date Deposited: | 05 Mar 2020 01:26 | ||||||
| Last Modified: | 05 Mar 2020 01:26 | ||||||
| Item ID: | 16969 | ||||||
| Journal or Publication Title: | THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science | ||||||
| Publisher: | Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco | ||||||
| Official URL: | https://www.ehu.eus/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/... | ||||||
| DOI or Unique Handle: | 10.1387/theoria.21031 | ||||||
| Subjects: | Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Concepts and Representations Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Learning and Memory General Issues > Philosophers of Science |
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| Date: | January 2020 | ||||||
| Page Range: | pp. 45-57 | ||||||
| Volume: | 35 | ||||||
| Number: | 1 | ||||||
| ISSN: | 2171-679X | ||||||
| URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/16969 |
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