Dietrich, Franz and List, Christian (2021) Dynamically rational judgment aggregation. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Judgment-aggregation theory has always focused on the attainment of rational collective judgments. But so far, rationality has been understood in static terms: as “coherence” of judgments at a given time, understood as consistency, completeness, and/or deductive closure. By contrast, this paper discusses whether collective judgments can be dynamically rational, so that they change rationally in response to new information. Formally, a judgment aggregation rule is dynamically rational with respect to a given revision operator if, whenever all individuals revise their judgments in light of some information (a learnt proposition), then the new aggregate judgments are the old ones revised in light of this information, i.e., aggregation and revision commute. We prove a general impossibility theorem: if the propositions on the agenda are sufficiently interconnected, no judgment aggregation rule with standard properties is dynamically rational with respect to any revision operator satisfying some mild conditions (familiar from belief revision theory). Our theorem is the dynamic-rationality analogue of some well-known impossibility theorems for static rationality. We also explore how dynamic rationality might be achieved by relaxing some of the conditions on the aggregation rule and/or the revision operator.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Dietrich, Franz List, Christian
Keywords:	Judgment aggregation, belief revision, dynamic rationality, impossibility theorems
Subjects:	General Issues > Decision Theory Specific Sciences > Economics General Issues > Social Epistemology of Science
Depositing User:	Christian List
Date Deposited:	06 Feb 2021 21:10
Last Modified:	06 Feb 2021 21:10
Item ID:	18674
Subjects:	General Issues > Decision Theory Specific Sciences > Economics General Issues > Social Epistemology of Science
Date:	2 February 2021
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/18674

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• Dynamically rational judgment aggregation. (deposited 06 Feb 2021 21:10) [Currently Displayed]
  • Dynamically rational judgment aggregation. (deposited 18 May 2024 07:43)

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