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Rigour and Thought Experiments: Burgess and Norton

Brown, James Robert (2021) Rigour and Thought Experiments: Burgess and Norton. [Preprint]

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Abstract

This article discusses the important and in uential views of John Burgess on the
nature of mathematical rigour and John Norton on the nature of thought
experiments. Their accounts turn out to be surprisingly similar in spite of diff�erent subject matters. Among other things both require a reconstruction of the initial proof or thought experiment in order to o�cially evaluate them, even though we almost never do this in practice. The views of each are plausible and seem to solve interesting problems. However, both have problems and would seem not able to do justice to some interesting examples. They fail in similar ways. More pluralistic accounts of proof and of thought experiment could embrace aspects of each, while rejecting their claimed universality. An ideal account (not provided here) would contribute to explanation and understanding. These are important topics for future work.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Brown, James Robertjrbrown@chass.utoronto.ca
Keywords: rigorous proof, thought experiment, evidence, reconstruction
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Mathematics > History of Philosophy
Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Methodology
Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Proof
General Issues > Thought Experiments
Depositing User: James Robert Brown
Date Deposited: 25 Mar 2021 03:36
Last Modified: 25 Mar 2021 03:36
Item ID: 18849
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Mathematics > History of Philosophy
Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Methodology
Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Proof
General Issues > Thought Experiments
Date: 24 March 2021
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/18849

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